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Abstract
The Social policy discourse of the EU is characterized by its continuous evolution. True, there are
shifts in emphasis and change in the buzzwords; Social Model, Flexicurity, and Employability are
examples. Still, beneath stylistic fluctuations, a common thread through policy development can be
discerned since the Delors era. This paper is an attempt to figure out such continuity and seek its
foundation in the existence of a rather stable policy community. 
Specifically, the paper highlights the role of academics and policy experts. The paper proceeds in
three steps. First, it traces the development of the social policy discourse since the Delors era, based
on comprehensive examination of the presidency conclusions of the European Council and the
important social policy documents. This will show that recent topics and policy frames can be traced
back to the earlier days, which is conditioned by the institutional configuration and objective policy tasks
which the EU has been faced with. 
Second, this paper insists that such continuity cannot be taken for granted, because the issues
are electorally important and the political power balance has shifted many times. As an explanation of
such not-so-natural continuity, the paper stresses the role of the social policy community surrounding
the EU institutions, especially that of academics and policy experts. Through the analysis of the
participants and contents of the presidency conferences, academic reports and policy papers, it is
shown that relatively stable members of the policy community have been continuously mobilized. 
Lastly, as a first step to gauge the net effect of that policy community, this paper picks up several
examples to illuminate when and how this policy community takes effects and where the limits lie. In the
end, the paper proposes a punctuated Europeanization metaphor as a description of the policy
dynamics in the social policy domain. 
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1Experts and Academics as Idea Generator and Promulgator: Identifying the Social Policy
Community of the European Union
Ryosuke AMIYA-NAKADA (Meiji Gakuin University)
1.Introduction
One of the most intensively investigated topics in the European integration research is the
influences of the EU level developments on the national level polity, politics and policies. So-called
"Europeanization" study is a prominent example. Although it has been modified and refined in
response to criticisms, the original image of the Europeanization process, exemplified by the
"goodness-of-fit" hypothesis, reflects a rather formal-institutional and staged model of policy
processes. Namely, the policy was first determined at the EU level, then the task of implementation
falls on the member states and the analytical focus is on how they react to that specific EU
legislations.
At least in some policy areas, however, this model does not fit neatly. It may be useful in the
policy areas where the EU has the extensive formal legislative responsibility and power, as in the
case of competition policy. In contrast, in those policy areas where the EU has the weak rule-
making power, policy instruments of the EU institutions, especially the Commission, include
necessarily soft ones. Thus the "New Modes of Governance" draw the attention of the practitioners
and researchers. In this "soft" channel of influence, it is quite difficult to measure the channel and
extent of European influences on national changes. This paper is an attempt to identify one
possible channel of transnational policy diffusion and suggest possible conditions of its
effectiveness.
For this type of investigation, the Advocacy Coalition Framework is of help. Its initial intention
was to move beyond the formal institutional power analysis, like the President versus the
Congress, the Iron Triangle, et cetra. This nicely fits with our concern, to pay more attention to the
transnational and informal aspects of policy dynamics in the European Union. The ACF explicitly
aimed at including an intergovernmental dimension and expanding the analytical focus on
journalists, analysts, researchers and others (Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith 1993, 24).
There are, however, a few differences in terms of academic concern and the institutional
settings. First, the concern of this paper is more of continuity and evolution than change. Second,
the ACF usually presupposes two or three competing advocacy coalitions. In our case, this does
not apply, which will be discussed in the third section of the paper. Third, the institutional
architecture of the European Union is more complex and fragmented. In addition to that, due to the
multi-level nature of the EU, it cannot be assumed a priori if an advocacy coalition includes actors
from different levels. Brussels is more distant to the EU citizens than Washington D. C. is to the US
citizens. Our strategy is focussing on the EU level at first, then examining its "reach" beyond
Brussels.
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"applying" the framework to our case. And we use the term "policy community" as descriptive
concept for a set of people with shared values and orientations, operating in the policy subsystem.
When we explicitly refer to the ACF, we use "advocacy coalition" as an inter-changeable
expression to the policy community.
In the next section, we first trace the development of the EU social policy discourse for these
fifteen years, to highlight the relative stability and rather evolutionary nature of its adaptation. But
this is not self-evident if we consider the changes in the economic and political environment and
fluctuation of "political center of gravity" (Manow, Schäfer and Zorn 2008) of the EU. So, in the third
section, we identify a stable policy community in the EU social policy, which is a source of policy
stability and evolution. In this policy community, some academics have been playing a central role
for years. In the fourth section, some examples concerning the "reach" of the EU policy community
is presented and several possibilities are suggested. In the final section, we summarise our
findings and arguments and discuss some implications.
Our central contribution in this paper is identification of the EU social policy community at the
very concrete, personal level. Another contribution is methodological. We identify the policy
community using the data on such neglected activities like the Presidency academic conferences
or the advisory personnel and groups to the Commission and the Member States. The work is still
in progress, and the data is not exhaustive, just illustrative. We hope this may enhance our
knowledge on how the "soft" policy transfer and diffusion occurs.
2.Development of the "European Social Model" discourse
It is commonplace to use the phrase "European Social Model" in the discussion of the
economic and social policies of the European Union. It came to the fore especially after the launch
of the Lisbon Strategy in the 2000 Lisbon European Summit. It is now well know that its declared
aim was "to become the most competitive and dynamic knowledge-based economy in the world
capable of sustainable economic growth with more and better jobs and greater social cohesion"
and one of the three aims was "modernising the European social model, investing in people and
combating social exclusion". From these short quotes, it is clear that this strategy is an attempt to
find a solution of the economic and social problems in a positive-sum combination of dynamic
economic growth and social security.
Much has been written and discussed about the Lisbon Strategy concerning its emergence,
its novelty, and its effects. It is rather rare, however, to put this Strategy into longer time frame.
Below, based on an extensive reading of all the Presidency conclusions and important policy
proposals in the social policy domain since 1993, it will be shown that the Lisbon Strategy is not so
unique in terms of its contents. Rather, it should be seen in the continuous development at least
since the Maastricht Treaty and its "evolutionary" character is to be emphasized. 
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In the discussion over the "European Social Model", a Green Paper in 1993 titled "European
Social Policy - Options for the Union" (COM (93) 551 final, 17 November 1993) is sometimes
referred to as its beginning. In fact, this Green Paper is the first important policy document explicitly
to use the word "Social Model". The issues dealt in this Green Paper overlaps with the current
discussions, but emphasis is put differently in some cases.
First, it is remarkable in the policy documents in this period that complementary nature of the
macro and micro aspects of economy or economic reforms is stressed. For example, in the
presidency conclusion of the 1993 Copenhagen European Council, which is usually noted for its
adoption of the "Copenhagen Criteria" for the Eastern Enlargement, the priority is given to the
employment problem against the background of the ratification failure in Denmark due to the
referendum in June 1992. As a way out of legitimacy crisis, the "European Council pledged the
determination of the Community and its Member States to restore confidence through the
implementation of a clear strategy ... to restore sustainable growth, reinforce the competitiveness
of European industry and reduce unemployment (Presidency Conclusion, European Council in
Copenhagen, 21-22 June 1993)". It is remarkable that the first instrument for the recovery is
sought in the short-term fiscal measures; increase in the national-level investment and the
additional contribution to the European Investment Bank. In the medium to long term, too,
macroeconomic measures are listed as necessary to complement structural reforms.
Second, it is also characteristic of policy discourse in this period that the role of the structural
fund is stressed. It is quite natural in view of restricted policy instruments of the EU concerning
economic and social policy at that time. But emphasis on the direct intervention by the EU is more
an expression of political will, which is hardly seen the discourse in the 2000s.
Third, in terms of policy instruments, more hope is placed on the "Social Dialogue"
procedures introduced in the Maastricht Social Protocol. In almost every policy documents
referring to the Social Model, the Social Dialogue is located in the central places. Jacques Delors,
then the President of the Commission, is known for his commitment to the establishment of this
procedure and he had high hope on Social Dialogue to circumvent political deadlock at the Council
and put pressure from the domestic social actors on each national government. 
In terms of policy contents, we should note that the issues discussed under the Lisbon
framework was already taken up in this period. In the communication "Towards a Europe of
Solidarity" (COM (92) 542 final, 23 December 1992), the commission says that the maximum
support from citizens are only acquired only when the development of the Social Dimension of the
integration is achieved, also pointing to the importance of the participation by the trade unions,
employer organizations and the NGOs. It is also notable that this communication already picked up
social exclusion as a multi-dimensional phenomenon, based on the 1989 Council resolution.
Further topics as Danish model, Minimum Income Guarantee, are already referred to in this
communication. Even the numerical employment target, which has become almost synonymous to
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("Community-wide Framework for Employment" (COM (93) 238 final, 26 May 1993)).
There are some differences, too, in terms of policy content. In the famous white paper in the
Delors era, "Growth, Competitiveness and Employment (COM (93) 700 final/A and B, 5 December
1993)", the reduction of working time and work sharing is given much places, which fade out in the
later policy papers.
To summarize, social policy issues under the Lisbon Strategy was already there in the policy
discourse of the 1990s. Still, there are differences in terms of policy instruments and policy
contents. Further, the word "Social Model" itself disappears in other Commission Communications
and presidency conclusions in this period, except the 1993 Green Paper, which suggests that the
discourse of "Social Model" was not firmly rooted yet. In the next years, however, expression and
terminology of the "Social Model" becomes established framework in the EU social policy
discourse.
(2) Institutionalization of the "Social Model" (late 1990s)
In the Essen European Council in December 1994, it was agreed to aim at labour-intensive
growth, for which the Member States should submit an annual report from 1995. This is the starting
point of the policy development leading to the Lisbon Strategy.
There are several points to be noted for this period. First, it is most remarkable that the
phrase "Social Model" had secured foothold in the EU social policy discourse. This is typically
shown in the Communication "The Future of Social Protection: A Framework for a European
Debate" (COM (95) 466 final, 31 October 1995). The paper begins with a clear sentence, "Social
protection represents a fundamental component and a distinguishing feature of the European
model of society", but the reform was under consideration "to replace the old rigidities with more
flexibility, while at the same time maintaining this objective of solidarity". In the Communication
"The European Employment Strategy: Recent Progress and the Prospects for the Future"  (COM
(95) 465 final, 11 October 1995) published three weeks before, the aim was to achieve both more
incentive to work and the social protection system and it was stated that the need to adapt the
European model of society to the current situation. 
This policy initiatives resulted in the agreement on the approaches to the creation of
employment at the Madrid European Council in December 1995, which included the necessity of
both macro-economic policies and structural policies, co-operation of the Social Partners, more
efficient social protection system, removal of labour disincentive and so on. In 1996, the French
President Jacques Chirac made a contribution, "Pour un modele social europeen", to the
newspaper Liberation before the Turin European Council, which was taken up and discussed in the
Inter-govenmental Conference and the European Council. In his contribution, Chirac urged to
make employment as a criteria for all the policy measures and wanted more measures at the EU
level than mere resolutions and reports. In this period, the "European Social Policy Forum" was
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various indicators was under way. In this way, the stake in the European social policy became
higher.
Second, a policy orientation emerged from those discussions. It was a direct linkage between
social policy and employment policy, represented by such expression as "active social policy". This
was an approach to maintain a certain level of social protection but encourage more participation in
the labour market. This was well epitomized in the title of the Dutch Presidency Conference in
1997, "Social Protection as a Productive Factor".
Third, it is also of interest that we can already find the "flexicurity" issue, which was the main
issue in 2006 and 2007, in this period. In the June 1996 document "Action for Employment in
Europe: A Confidence Pact" (CSE (96) 1 final, 5 June 1996), those issues like flexibility and
security, diversified working hours and work-life balance were discussed and the expression
"flexisecurity" was already found. In the following documents, the pair "flexibility and security"
recurred again and again (cf. COM (97) 102; Presidency Conclusions, Luxemburg Extraordinary
European Council, 20 and 21 November 1997, Point 70). 
(3)The Launch of Lisbon Strategy (2000-2004)
The Lisbon Strategy, agreed upon in the March 2000 European Council, was not a sudden
innovation. Rather, it was the culmination of the employment and social policy development
throughout the 1990s. There. the modernization of the European Social Model was explicitly
agreed.
There are several background factors to the adoption of the Strategy. First, Europe was
under favorable economic conditions reaching peak in 2000 and the unemployment rate was going
down. In other words, there blew the following wind for the policy initiatives since 1990s. Second,
most Member States had left or center-left government, which will be discussed later. Third, a
variety of policy initiatives were already accumulated throughout the 1990s. For example, the
employment rate target of 70% was already on the table in the 1999 Communication "Community
Policies in Support of Employment "(COM (99) 167 final, 21 April 1999), which also proposed the
synergy of employment and economic policy, activation of labour force, life-long learning. This
Communication was preceded by the European Council agreement in November 1997 and the
Commission report in 1998 (COM (98) 572 final, 14 October 1998).
As a result, the "modernization of the European Social Model" became a political consensus
at the EU level, the materializaion and the implementation of which was the next agenda.
Substantially, the idea of the linkage between employment or social policy and economic policy
was institutionalized in the EU social policy discourse, which has made the subsequent policy
debates focussed on the "balance" of both concerns, not an "either-or" type of debate.
(4) Policy change under the Barroso Commission ? (2004-)
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Manuel Barroso took the office of the Commission President in 2004, succeeding center-left
Romano Prodi. This moved the overall policy direction rightward to the more liberal economic
policies.
In terms of social policy ,this change did not lead to the retrenchment, as in the case of the
Member States in 1980s and 1990s. Based on the institutionalized framing of the linkage between
employment, social and economic policy, the shift in emphasis was observed and social policy
became mainly directed at the creation of employment. In the European Council in March 2005,
the Lisbon Strategy was relaunched, with a renewed focus on growth and employment. Active
labor market policies and making work pay became the topic of the day, and "flexicurity", which
was already found in late 1990s, came to the fore in the following years.
Although the duo "flexibility and security" was already found before, "flexicurity" first
appeared in the Presidency Conclusion in the March 2006 European Council. This European
Council was preceded by the informal Hampton Court European Council held in October 2005. At
this informal meeting, it was expected that there would be a big debate on the "Social Model".
Barroso came with a Communication on "European Values in a Globalised World" (COM 2005 525
final, October 20, 2005). He was expected to make an alliance with Blair toward further
liberalization. The European Trade Union Congress issued an warning at the Tripartite Social
Summit for Growth and Employment three days before the Summit, the social NGOs presented
their concerns with their own declarations (http://www.euractiv.com/en/socialeurope/eu-debates-
european-social-model/article-146338; Torreblanca 2005). From the EU social policy community,
André Sapir submitted a paper "Globalisation and the reform of the European social models" to be
presented at the ECOFIN Informal Meeting on 9 September. Here, Sapir pointed out that there
were four, not one, "models" in Europe and the Anglo-Saxon Model was not the only alternative.
The Scandinavian Model was almost as efficient, and with higher level of social protection.  
In the end, showdown was avoided. There was no discussion on the "Model(s)". The Social
Platform, a loose coalition of the European Social NGOs, declared " After a long battle the citizens
are back at the core of the Lisbon Strategy. [...] For the last year Social NGOs have been fighting
hard to save the social vision of Europe and we were all relieved to see that thanks to the Austrian
Presidency the citizens’ main concerns were back at the core of the Lisbon Strategy and the
central role of social cohesion to achieve the EU objectives was recognised in the Conclusions of
the Spring Summit.(Social Voices, 16, April-June 2006)" Even the Presidency - the Commision
President duo could not break the policy consensus.
(5) Fluctuations in the Political Balance of Power and Continuity as a Puzzle
As we see in the above, the development of the Social Model discourse in these fifteen years
is more of "evolution" than "change". Then, what's the matter with "evolution"? It is argued below
that those continuous development is not so self-evident, considering the changing political
1
7
7balance and coalition at the Council and the rotating presidency system. 
It is often pointed out that the Amsterdam Treaty and the ensuing social policy initiatives were
possible under the condition of general social democratic dominance in the European Capitals. In
1997, the Labour Party under the Tony Blair won the majority in the British General Elections in
May, Lionel Jospin of the French Socialist Party assumed the premiership as a result of  the
parliamentary election in May and June. Before that, Poul Nyrup Rasmussen ruled Denmark since
1993, Wim Kok led Dutch government since 1994, and the center-left "Olive" coalition won the
1996 Italian Election ousting Berlusconi. Center-left victories in the UK and France gives further
momentum to that trend, which reached the pinnacle in the electoral success of the German Social
Democrats under Gerhard Schröder in September 1998.
This kind of political explanation apparently gives an plausible explanation to the launch of
the Lisbon Strategy. It is impossible, however, to explain why there was no visible change after the
end of center-left dominance. 
Already in May 2001, Italian electorate brought Silvio Berlusconi back into the Premiership.
Danish Social Democrats lost power in November, Jospin suffered disaster in the French
presidential election in April 2002, failing to proceed to the second round. The downturn of the
European center-left was most dramatically shown in the Dutch general election in May 2002. The
Dutch Labor Party under Wim Kok, with internationally renowned "Dutch Miracle" and the good
economic performance (unemployment rate 2.6%, GDP erowth around 3%), had to suffer a
historical defeat with its parliamentary seats almost halved. 
If we view the EU policy making mainly from intergovernmental perspective, and assume that
each governmental attitude is at least partly shaped by its partisan preferences, this change of
partisan composition should be reflected in the polcy change of the EU. This is a plausible
hypothesis considering the limited competence of the EU in this policy domain. But it was not the
case, as we have already reviewed. Even if we find a policy change, it is after taking office of the
Barrosso commission in 2004. And still, the change is not that of policy paradigm but that of
accent. 
Beyond these anecdotal suggestions, we proceed further to show the non-obviousness of
policy continuity by examining the political orientations of the Council and Presidency. 
First, political color of the Commission President and the social policy Commissioner has
been changing.  After Mid-1980s, both center-left and center right politicians took the office of the
Commission President; Delors (1985-1994) from the French Socialists, Santer from the Luxemburg
Christian Democrats (1995-1999), Prodi from the Italian "Olive" coalition (1999-2004) and Barosso
from the center-right Portuguese Social Democrats (2004-). 
The partisan composition of the Council has been fluctuating as well, reflecting the
governmental takeover in the member states. Manow, Schäfer and Zorn (2008) shows that political
center of gravity of the council lay generally in the right in the 1980s, then moved leftward in the
1990s and swung back again to the right after 2000. This partly explains the progress in the EU
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may indicate the general policy direction but cannnot fully explain respective policy initiatives.
Typical example is the adopition of the Social Protocol attached to the Maastricht Traty, which is
supported by those member states like Germany, many of which were governed the center-right
parties.
The roles of the Presidency is not yet fully examined but it is sure that it has an important
agenda-setting function. The presidency rotates in six months, political color as well. If we assume
that every presidency exerts policy influence based on partisan orientation, policy change in a zig-
zag manner would be possible.
2000  Portugal (left)          France (left)
2001  Sweden (left)          Belgium (liberal + social democrat)
2002  Spain (right)            Denmark (right)
2003  Greece (left)           Italy (left)
2004  Ireland(right)           Netherlands (right)
2005  Luxemburg (right)   UK (left)
2006  Austria (left)            Finland (right)
2007  Germany (right)      Portugal (left)
Table 1 Political Orientation of the Council Presidency
To summerize, if we draw attention to the partisan proentations of the formal political organs,
fluctuation rather than continuity is expected. True, political coalition building is quite important in
explaining specific decision-making in the council. In that process, not just partisan orientation, but
also national policy legacies (Johnson 2005) and transnational coalision (Johansson 1999) are
important factors.
It is not the case, however, in the policy iniatives at the EU level. Beside the coalition building
at the decision phase, this paper contends that policy-making or the formulation of policy initiatives
is also important. This is because those initiatives are monopolized by the commission,  and the
coalition most effectively works in revision and decision of already tabled policy initiatives.
3. Identifying the EU Social Policy Community
In spite of possible political fluctuations, it is the "Social Model" advocacy coalition, including
DG Employment, civil society organizations, and, the last but not least, academics, which nurtures
the evolution of the "Social Model" discourse.
(1) Bureaucratic source of continuity
Whence comes this continuity? A part of the answer lies in the bureaucratic continuity.
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Vasso Papandreou from the Greek New Socialists, Padraig Flynn from Irish Fiana Fall, Anna
Diamantopaulou again from the Greek New Socialists, and Vladimir Spidra from the Czech Social
Democrats. In comparison with the partisan composition in general, the social policy commissioner
comes from those parties friendly to the social policy in general.
Further, examination of the high officals in the DG employment shows another source of
continuity (following analysis is based on various annuals of the Commission, namely  Annuaire de
la commission de la communaute economique europeene, Organigramme de la Commission des
Communautes europeenes，Who's who in the European Union? ). First we examine the Director-
General, the chef on the DG bureaucrats side. Jean Degimbe had served for sixteen years since
1976 (http://wwwarc.eui.eu/ech/binFR/CreaInt.asp?rc=INT-ECH691). He was a long-serving
European official, recruited to the ECSC High Authority by  Christian-social Roger Raynaud, who
was from the French Christian Union CFTC. He then served under the vice president Raymond
Barre, President Ortoli. During his reign, the line-up of the high officials were stabile. After three
years of vacancy, the post was filled by Allan Larsson from 1995 to 2000. He was a Swedish Social
Democrat, who had served as a President of the Swedish Labour Market Office and the Minister of
Finance
(http://www.varnamo.se/naringsliv/gottomplats/ambassadorer/allanlarsson.4.18ff2710e077ef56080
0010591.html)[8]．From 2000, Odile Quintin served for six years. She entered the commission in
1971 directly after her graduation from University.  After experiences in the DG Agriculture and the
DG External Affairs, she had worked for the DG Employment since 1982
(http://www.oecd.org/speaker/0,3438,fr_21571361_35042830_35287523_1_1_1_1,00.html)．Sinc
e 2005, Nikolaus van der Pas has been Director-General. After working in the German and Dutch
private companies, he came to the Commission in 1963 and spent many years in the Public
Relations and External Affairs. His previous job was the Director-General of the DG Education
(http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/employment_social/organigram/cv_vanderpas_en.pdf)．
The Deputy Director-General was created in 1993. Hywel Ceri Jones had occupied this
position first,  for five years. He had also been working in the Commission for many years, mostly
in Education and Employment. He became the Director of the Education, Vocational Training and
Youth Policy in 1981(Organigramme, Decembre 1981), then served as a member of a task force
on educational problems before assuming this position in 1993. After him, Quitin was Deputy
Director General for two years, and Karl-Johan Lonnroth succeeded her since 2000. He was a
genuine social policy official, who had worked in the Finnish Ministry of Labor for twenty years and
then moved to the ILO before coming to the Commission in 1996
(http://ec.europa.eu/civil_service/docs/directors_general/lonnroth_en.pdf). Since 2005, Lenia
Samuel has been serving, whose previous position was the General Secretary of the Cypriot
Ministry of Labor and Social Security, where he had worked since his university graduation
(http://ec.europa.eu/civil_service/docs/directors_general/samuel_en.pdf)．
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years of experience, whether in case of internal promotion within the Commission or external
transfer from the Member States. This must guarantees policy continuity to some extent. 
A few remarks are in order. First, as exemplified by the current Director General, some top
officials did not have previous experiences in the social policy field. Among nine Directors of the
DG Employment (as of the end of 2007), only two have worked for the DG for more than ten years.
New appointment at the Director level often includes promotion from other DGs, which means that
there is no closed track for the social policy bureaucrats.
Second, "Brussels" is often described as a bureaucratic monster in the popular press, but the
Commission in not so gigantic in reality. As of September 2009, about 25,000 regular employee
worked for the Commission, 600 for the DG Employment. Among them, however, those
bureaucrats influential in the policy-making (AD) were just around 340
(http://ec.europa.eu/civil_service/docs/bs_dg_category_en.pdf). As the DG composed of nine
Directorates, which have about four Divisions, one division has around ten bureaucratic policy
makers. Considering the huge co-ordination tasks with other DGs, other EU Institutions and the
Member States, one can hardly say that the DG is equipped with enough human resources to
monopolize policy formulation. 
Thus, the Commission cannot guarantee policy continuity by itself. In fact, it is often pointed
out that the Commission is rather open to external policy advice (Smith 2004; Borras 2007; Mazey
and Richardson 2006; Degger and Kambeck 2007; Interview with Roshan Di Puppo，Philippe
Pochet). We have to investigate further to find external actors in the advocay coalition.
(2) Academics constituting the policy community
In identifying the EU social policy community, this paper is focused on external, mainly
academic actors. They contribute to the development in the EU social policy through several
channels. 
a. Standing advisory organs
First we examine various instiutionalized advisory organs surrounding the Commission. This
kind of an officla think-tank was first established on Delors' initiative as the "Forward Studies Unit"
in 1989. The unit was composed of fifteen members, which is supposed to submit a report on
important issues directly to the Commission President
(http://ec.europa.eu/comm/cdp/mission/index_en.htm). Activities of this unit includes publication of
"Euroepe 2010" and the preparation of the White Paper on European Governance.
In May 2001, the Prodi Commission established the Group of Policy Advisers (GOPA) to
succeed the Forward Studies Unit. The GOPA had six divisions, Economy, Science and
Technology and Society, Foreign Affairs, External Relations, Dialogue with Religions, Churches
and Humanisms and Public Opinion and Communication Strategies. The Group of Economic
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members" and the executive director, Andre Sapir. Except Sapir, they were officials from the
Commission. The Group had twenty-five "external members" , which was composed of university
professors and researches in the think-tanks and economic analysis institutions. Among them,
some experts are notable in their continuous presence afterwards; Jean Pisani Ferry, then
Executive President of the Conseil d’Analyse Economique, Maria Joao Rodrigues, Special adviser
to the Portuguese Prime Minister and Professor of Economics in Lisbon University, and Klaus
Zimmermann, President of the German Institute for Economic Research. Especially, Rodrigues'
role is important, which led Zeitlin (2007) to call her "Mother of the OMC". She had already
participated in the so-called Gillenhammer Working Party on industiral change, which was set up
by the 1997 Luxemburg European Council.
In 2005, the Group of Economic Analysis was further re-organized into the Group of
Economic Policy Analysis (GEPA) as a part of the Bureau of European Policy Advisers (BEPA).
The Bureau had three expert groups, the declared aim of which is "These expert groups bring
together officials from other Commission services and selected external experts from academia,
policy centres and the business community". In the GEPA, external members were reduced to
twelve, which included Pisany-Ferry and Sapir.
In the BEPA, a new expert group dealing with social policy is established as the "Group of
Societal Policy Analysis". This group was expected to give an advice to the reform of the European
Social Modell. The Group is chaired by Loukas Tsoukalis, then Professor of Oxford University, and
includes eleven academics. It is remarkable that most of this eleven members are broadly social
democratic adovocates of the modernization of the European Social Model, who have already
taken part in the EU policy formulation.
Gosta Esping-Andersen and Maurizio Ferrera have already been engaged in those activities
as the academic report submitted to the Presidency. Fritz Scharpf, former Director of the Max-
Plank-Institute of the Study of Society, was well known adviser to the German Social Democrats.
Francois Bourguignon was former vice-president of the World Bank, who belonged to the group
"gauche-en-europe" which was established by Michel Rocard and Dominique Strauss-Kahn of the
French Socialist Party (http://www.gauche-en-europe.org/IMG/pdf/cos-2.pdf).) Beside Bourginon,
Esping-Andersen and Pisany-Ferry was member of the academic council of "gauche-en-europe".
Manuel Castel participated in the expert conferences preceding the Lisbon European Council in
2000,  and Julian Le Grand was adviser to Tony Blair on Health Policy. Jitka Rychtarikova is
special adviser to the Employment Commisionar Spidra. Zimmermann headed the Berlin Economic
Institute, known for its closeness to the trade unions, and changed its policy orientation toward
more liberal one (Forschungsprovinzialismus und okonomischer Mainstream,
http://www.bdwi.de/forum/archiv/archiv/97825.html; Frankfurter Rundschau, 31. Mai 2003, "Mit
Frührente muss Schluss sein")．
Two other members, Frans Van Vught and João Borges de Assuncao, can be called
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12"liberal" .The fomer was member of the Dutch liberal D66
(http://www.observant.unimaas.nl/default.asp?page=/jrg24/obs6/art45.htm) and member of the
advisory group to the Prime Minister Balkenende, and the latter was economic adviser to Barrosso,
when he was prime minister of Portugal.
In recent years, Roger Liddle, a Principal Advisor in the BEPA, have played a most visible
role such as the co-author of the policy paper "Europe's Social Reality: A Consultation Paper from
the Bureau of Euroepan Policy Advisers", submitted to the 2007 Spring European Council. A Public
consultation was launched based on this policy document, which resulted in the communication
"Opportunities, Access and Solidarity: Towards a New Social Vision for 21st Century Europe"
(COM(2007)726) and a Commission Staff Working Paper (SEC(2008)1896). He was a special
advisor of Tony Blair on European Policy from 1997 to 2004 and also known for a co-authored
book with Peter Mandelson , The Blair Revolution, which was famous for its character as "the
nearest appoximation to a manifesto of the New Labour's modernisatoin programme (Forey 2000,
99)" (http://www.cumberland-news.co.uk/news/viewarticle.aspx?id=567433). His presence in the
Barrosso Commision may surely show the shift in emphasis toward more liberal orientation. Still, it
is within the policy community. 
b.Special advisory organs
Beside these standing groups, it is quite commomplace to call up a advisory groups for a
specific policy objective. The "High Level Group on Industrial Relations" was set up following the
Commission's Communication on the Social Agenda of June 2000 and submitted its report in 2002.
It was chaired by Rodrigues and ten members, among which each three members came from the
labor and the employers. Four academic members included Rodrigues and Jelle Visser, the co-
autor of the book "Dutch Miracle." The "Employment Task Force", set up in 2003 under Wim Kok's
chiarmanship, had seven members including five academics. Rodrigues and Günther Schmid, who
had adovocated the introduction of flexibility element in the German labor market in reference to
the Dutch and Danish experiences, belonged to this Task Force. The "High Level Group on the
future of social policy in an enlarged European Union" had worked from 2002 to 2004. It is
composed of five members, among which were Rodrigues and Anthony Atkinson, who have
worked for the EU related activity since 1990s and co-autored a presidency report on social
inclusion. Further eight experts who provided a substantial input were named, including Sapir and
Zimmermann.
The exsistence of a rather stable policy community can be seen in the drafting process of the
Constitutional Treaty. The Working Group nine of the Convention, to deal with social policy, made
hearings inviting Diamantopoulou (then Employment Commissioner), Vandenbrouck (former
Flemish Minisgter of Social Affairs), Atkinson and Olivier Dutheillet de Lamothe, chair of the "High
Level Group on the future of social policy in an enlarged European Union".
As is shown above, special advisory organs includes several, so to say "core" members like
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13Rodrigues, Sapir and Atkinson. The reports submitted by these advisery organs usually function as
baseline for the subsequent policy initiatives and their influence cannnot be underestimated.
In contrast, although similar in its objective, the "High-level Group on the Lisbon Strategy",
set up in 2004 preparing its mid-term review in 2005, was different in its composition. As in the
case of the "Employment Task Force", it was chaired by Wim Kok, but it was mostli composed of
parliamentarians, employers and trade union leaders. In fact, some academics were there, but they
are specialists on Environment and Economics. The resulting "Kok Report" adovocated
streamlining of the Lisbon Strategy, which is sometimes criticized as the set back for the social
aspects of the Strategy. As is seen in the composition of the Group, this report came from outside
of the policy community and it is the reason why the orientation of the report is somewhat different
from previous policy documents.
c.Presidency conferences
In addition to those formal advisory organs around the Commission, more diffuse activities by
the Presidency have contributed to the accumlation of the "Social Model" discourse. Here, we
focus on the Presidency academic conferences and reports submitted to it. As in case of the White
Papers and the Green Papers, which have been paid due attention in the EU research, those
academic Reports submitted to the Presidency have played non-negligible roles influencing policy
directions. Below is the list of academic conferences with intensive reports. 
                    Presidency  Authors
Mar. 2000    Portugal       Ferrera, Hemerijck, Esping-Andersen
Sep. 2001   Belgium        Esping-Andersen, Gallie, Hemerijck, Myles
Jun. 2003    Greece        Amitsis, Berghman, Hemerijck, Sakellaropoulos, Stergiou, Stecvens
Jul. 2005     Luxenbourg  Atkinson, Cantillon, Marlier, Nolan
Nov. 2006   Finland         Kvist, Saari, Le Grand, Hemerijck, and others
Jun. 2007    Portugal       Rodrigues, Hemerijck, Schmid, Berghman and others
Table 2 Reports submitted to the Presidency Conferences and their Main Authors
It is clear that the member of the policy community surrounding the Commission also formed
core of those Presidency conferences. Judging from the authors, the Presidency may have some
say in the selection, as is most clearly seen in the report to the Greek presidency. It is also notable
that the Dutch (2004 second) and Spanish (2002 first) Presidency did not convene those academic
conferences related to social policy. It may be the case that the Presidency simply ignore those
policy areas not comforming to their own policy preferences.
d. Academics as policy promulgagtor
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14Those core members of the EU social policy community, academics participating in the
discourse accumlation process, then amplify and promulgate the "Social Model" discourse in their
status as University based researchers. One of the examples of those functions is the publication
of the reports submitted to the Presidency conferences by academic publishers. The 2000 report
by Ferrera, Hemerijck and Esping-Andersen was scheduled for publication from the Oxford
University Press, the 2001 report by the Esping-Andersen and others from the OUP, too. The 2003
report of the Greek Presidency conference is published from the Hart Publishing, and the 2006
Finnish conference report and the 2005 Luxembourg report are from the Policy Press. Usually, the
EU policy documents are published from the Office for Official Publications of the European
Communities in Luxembourg. By inviting the renowned academics as the authors, these reports
can be distributed through the academic publishers.
Further, apart from those conferences convened by the EU and the national governmental
instituion, those academics have played an active and important part in conferences and
publications, which further accelerates the diffusion of the Social Model discourse. For example,
the British third-way think-tank "Policy Network" has organized a series of conferences and
published the contributions as a book "Global Europe, Social Europe" in 2006 from the Polity
Press. This book is a kind of an all-star cast of the EU social policy community, with Hemereijck,
Tsoukalis, Ferrera, Liddle and Lönnroth as contributors.
A part of the policy community has also participated in the EU research policy process. The
DG Research has set up the Advisory Group on "Social Sciences and Humanities in the European
Research Area", to provide advice regarding the sixth Framework Programme for RTD (from 2002
to 2006) and the European Research Area in Social Sciences
(ftp://ftp.cordis.europa.eu/pub/citizens/docs/advisory_group_members.pdf). One of the tasks of this
Advisory Group was "identifying the research priorities in the thematic priority 7 “Citizens and
Governance in a knowledge based society” in the seventh Framework Programme. Fifteen
members of this Groups includes Rodrigues, Gallie, and Thomas Meyer, who is one of the most
active academics in the programmatic discussion of the German Social Democratic Party. Four
members of this Advisory Group also belongs to the expert group called "Lisbon Agenda", which
has been organized by Rodrigues (http://www.mariajoaorodrigues.eu/lisbon-agenda/group/). In the
"Lisbon Agenda", Castel, Berghman and Robert Boyer have been taking part.
In case of lacking enthusiasm in the EU institutions, the policy community academics
sometimes stimulate the debate from outside. The "Sapir Report" in July 2003 is an example. Prodi
asked Sapir in July 2002 to submit a report on the achievement of the Lisbon Strategy goals and
the eastern enlargement. It resulted in the report authored by Sapiar and Pisany-Ferry
(http://www.euractiv.com/en/future-eu/controversial-expert-report-upsets-commissioners/article-
114693). But the report was so critical of the cohesion policy and the CAP that the Commissioners
on regional and agricultural policy sent highly negative response to the report, which made its
adopition as a formal "report" impossible. Prodi avoided to comment on that, saying that he was in
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15no position to make comments. Further, at the time the publication, the Convention on the Future
of Europe was at its final stage, which monopolized political attention. Thus, the report did not
stimulate any political dynamism.
Against this silence, the oldest think-tank in Brussels, the Center for European Policy
Studies, published a policy paper titled "Beyond the Sapir Report", to stimulate the debate
(http://www.euractiv.com/en/innovation/europe-deliver-growth-sapir-report/article-132113). Sapir
and Pisany-Ferry responded and reiterated their reccomendations as a policy paper "Last Exit to
Lisbon" in 2006 (Pisany-Ferry and Sapir 2006). 
In general terms, too, the wall separating inside and outside of the EU official institutions is
not so high, in terms of not only policy but also personnel. Aforementinoned Jones, who had
served as Deputy Director-General from 1993 to 1995, became the president of the exexcutive
committee of a Brussel based think tank, the European Policy Centre, in 2001 and worked there
for six years (http://www.epc.eu/PDF/Feb2007.pdf). On the other hand, Sapir and Pisany-Ferry,
now working outside, had been adviser to the Director Gerenal of the DG Economic and Financial
Affairs from 1990 to 1993.
(3) Discussion: the EU social policy community and the Advocacy Coalition Framework
As is shown above, policy formulation process of the EU social policy is accompanied by the
input and dissemination activities of the academics and the external policy experts. The
commission itself often invites them as policy advisers and academic contributors. They also works
outside the formal institutional framework, which helps accumulation and institutionalization of the
"Social Model" discourse. It is remarkable here that there are some "core" members, like
Rodrigues, Liddle and Hemerijck. Their political orientation is relatively similar, that of social
democratic modernization. This policy community functions as the advocacy coalition at the EU
level, which has enabled continuous policy development in these fifteen years.
In the Advocacy Coalition Framework, it is assumed that there are a few contending
adovocay coalitions in a policy subsystem, whose interactions and resulting policy change are the
focus of analysis. In the case of the EU social policy, we can find only one advocacy coalition
around the DG employment.
Why this anomaly? There are a few possible reasons. First, the stable policy community is
necessary as the EU institutional structure is notoriously fragmented. To reach consensus among
many veto players with different paritisan orientations and national interests, the policy needs to be
as "neutral" as possible. This necessiates moderate policy orientations, which is supported by the
relatively homegeneous advocacy coalition of bureaucrats and policy experts. 
Second, the policy formulation is less politicized due to diminished party poltical struggle at
the EU level. In the cases of the nation-states with fragmented institutional structures as Germany
and the United States, the political executive (US) or the political parties (Germany) can give a
political orientation from outside the bureaucratic machinery by way of political appointments or
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16promotion based on partisanship. This brings the party politics inside the policy subsystem.
Minority in the policy subsystem can depend on the power of political actors to attain policy
change, and the political actors can take political ownership of alternative policy ideas of the
minority. At the EU level, party political struggle is less noted, although one can see growing
politicization in the European Parliament. Further, the executive organ, the Commission, is based
on the Grand Coalition of the left and the right, and it is expeced that the Commissioner works for
the "European" interest, neither national nor partisan. 
Third, there is less incentive for political actors to raise a voice at the European level. As the
EU institutions are endowed with weak political power and resources, they must rely on the "soft"
methods to achieve many of goals raised in the Lisbon Strategy. Thus, those political acotrs who
have opposing policy orientations to the EU social policy community can simply "exit" from the EU-
level policy subsystem and move to the Member State level, stopping the policy initiatives at the
Council or ignoring them in the implementation stage.
As a result, the political dynamics over policy change is unfolded more between the policy
subsystems, rathar than inside the policy subsystem.
4. The reach of the policy community
As is suggested in the discussion of the previous section, it is not self-evident if the EU social
political community, or the advocacy coalition, extends over the institutional layers. It is
theoretically justifiable to presuppose that an advocacy coalition can be formed over the different
political levels. It is an empirical question, however, if it does really include the personnel from
different levels and take effect at all levels. Below, two examples are shown where the EU social
policy community can have an policy effect and reach beyond Brussels. At the same time, it is also
suggested that it is not always the case
(1) Presidency as a "window of opportunity"
The first example is about the role of the Presidency. As the EU has only weak social policy
competence, political backing is necessary for the initiatives based on the Social Model discourse
to materialize. The Council Presidency sometimes serves for that purpose.
Zeitlin (2007, 132) explain the set up of the Lisbon Strategy by the activities of the high
officials of the DG Employment. According to him, then the Director-General Larsson and his
Deputy Quitin had recognized and theorized the EES was quickly as an innovative approach to EU
governance, prior to the March 2000 Lisbon extraordinary European Council. In other words, the
Portuguese Presidency took the policy initiatives already under way inside the EU bureaucracy and
successfully introduced a policy innovation.
In this Lisbon Council, the "active welfare state" concept was introduced (Presidency
Conclusions, Lisbon European Council, 23 and 24 March 2000, para 24 - 34). This was followed by
its implementation in the form of the Pension OMC introduced under the Belgian Presidency in
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172001. Here, the political initiative by the Belgian Minister of Social Affairs, Frank Vandenbrouck,
was important. Vanhercke (2006) tells a quite interesting story about it.
During the Spring of 2001, the Belgian Minister for Social Affairs and Pensions, Frank
Vandenbroucke, preparing at that time “his” EU Presidency later that year (July-December 2001),
received a special visitor in his cabinet. Odile Quintin, then Director General of DG Social Affairs of the
European Commission, was invited to share her views on the priorities of the future Belgian
Presidency … and she altered them. Indeed, up to that point Frank Vandenbroucke, advised by his
Presidency Task Force, wanted to limit the agenda to, first, further developing EU co-operation with
regard to social inclusion and, second, finding agreement on the modernisation of Regulation 1408/71.
Obviously, Odile Quintin had made a correct judgement when she firmly insisted on speaking directly
to the minister, and not to the Chief of Cabinet or the Task Force: 60 minutes of discussion later, the
“Social Affairs” side of the future Belgian Presidency had a third priority, suggested by Odile Quintin :
preparing the open method of co-ordination on pension. (Vanhercke 2006, based on an interview with
Frank Vandenbroucke, 27 February 2006)
This is another example of political initiatives by the Presidency making internal policy
development materialize. There is a further aspect this story. Vandenbrouck had temporally retired
from public offices due to a political scandal, during which he was enrolled in the Oxford University
and earned a D.Phil from the Faculty of Social Studies. At Oxford, his advisor was Atkinson, which
means that Vandenbrouck had been already close to the "core" of the EU social policy community.
It is only natural that he took up the policy initiative proposed by Quintin. He insists that he had
devised the Dutch expression de actieve welvaartstaat (active welfare state), which departs from
the Bismarckian welfare states but is different from the Blairite "Third Way" (Vandenbroucke 2003).
In this way, the Social Model discourse can be translated into the concrete policy with the
help of the Presidency. Seen from the opposite direction, these examples show  that the pre-exiting
advocacy coalition and the institutionalized discourse enabled those "small" countries to take bold
steps in policy making, without voting or economic power.
(2) Spill-over of the discourse to the national level
In some cases, a part of the EU social policy community is directly linked to the national
policy community. This will serve as an institutional channel for "soft" Europeanization.
For example, the Center of Strategic Analysis of the French Government (Centre d'Analyse
strategique) was established based on the decree of June 2006, and one of its primary tasks was
the Lisbon Strategy (http://www.strategie.gouv.fr/rubrique.php3?id_rubrique=2). It had five division,
among which the Division of Labour, Employment and Vocational Traning was headed by  Yves
Chassard, who participated in the discussion of the High Level Group on Social Policy as an
external expert. Soon after its launch, the Center convened a workshop titled "Social Europe" in
October (Workshop <<Social Europe>>. The Social Dimension of the European Union: What are
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18the Prospects?, 23 October 2006. http://www.strategie.gouv.fr/IMG/pdf/ACTESEuropeSociale.pdf).
Many of the EU social policy community members were invited, including Liddle, Ferrera and
Tsoukalis.
It is already noted that Rodrigues was special adviser to the Prime Minister of Portugal
during its Council Presidency. Hemerick, who have authored many of the policy documents, has
been a member and the director of the Academic Advisory Council for the Dutch Government
(Wetenschappelijke Raad voor het Regeringsbeleid). He convened a symopisum titled "Toward
New Social Investment Agenda: The Future of the Dutch Welfare State" (Naar een nieuwe sociale
investeringsagenda: De toekomst van de Nederlandse verzorgingsstaat), to which Vandenbrouck
was invited as a speaker.
(3) Limits of the EU social policy community
In other cases, however, the accumulated policy discourse do not take effect or even just
ignored. 
For example, the German Government submitted its National Strategy Plan in 2005 to the
both houses of its Diet for the purpose of discussion. The Lower House bundled this draft report
with other social policy legislative proposals on agenda, and the debate was concentrated on those
legislative proposals without any comment on the National Strategy Report (Deutscher Bundestag,
Stenographischer Bericht, 16. Wahlperiode, 32. Sitzung, 6. April 2006). The Upper House with it
oppositional majority made an resolution, which was just for criticizing government and not about
its content (Bundesrat Drucksache, 413/1/05).
The impact on the social policy OMC is rather limited, according to the existing empirical
research (Zohlnhöfer and Ostheim 2005; Kröger 2006; Natali 2007, Ervik 2006). In the "Last Exit to
Lisbon" authored by Pisany-Ferry and Sapir (Pisany-Ferry and Sapir 2006), the commitment of
four types of actors, namely the parliament, the social partners, civil society and the follow-up was
examined. With an exception of Estonia, most countries could score only half, which showed still
lacking interest and commitment by the national actors. 
Thus, we cannot say that the EU social policy community always matters. Only in some
cases and under certain conditions, the policy community extends beyond Brussels and take real
effect on policy. My image here rather resemble the "policy stream" image of Kingdon (1984). The
EU policy process and the Member State policy process are usually autonomous and rather
isolated. In some cases, due to external pressure, political entrepreneurship and other reasons,
two processes became inter-connected. Till then, the general direction of the policy subsystem is
already determined at the EU level. Still, in the case of "soft" policy diffusion, the Member States
can resist to the influence by opposing or ignoring the input from the EU level. In this image, the
Europeanization does not proceed continuously. It is more intermittent. We may call this image
"punctuated Europeanization".
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195. Summary and implications
Let us summarise our findings in three points. First, the development of the EU social policy
is continuous and evolutionary, in spite of changing political climate. Second, we can identify the
stable EU social policy community behind evolution. In the community, several academics have
played an important role as generator of policy ideas and their promulgators. Third, the "reach" of
the EU policy community is usually limited. It need some political ally or favorable conditions for
those policy ideas to take effect.
These findings have several implications for further research. First, the Europeanization
research should pay more attention to those "soft" channels of influence, especially when the
formal competence of the EU institutions.is weak. For that purpose, we should also expand our
view and include seemingly non-political actors like academics in sight. Second, the
Europeanization research has tended to focus on "decision", but we should take longer-term
perspective, as recommended by the ACF, including policy formulation and implementation. With
short sight, one might mistake a policy idea with a long incubation period for a recent innovation,
as in the case of flexicurity. Third, the ACF may serve as a useful frame of reference, but it needs
some calibration for the application to the EU policy process. Especially, the fragmented and the
multi-level nature of the EU and the multiple veto-points should be carefully examined. Finally,
there are still unexplored sources for the examination of the EU policy process. Particularly, when
we want to know more about informal and soft aspects of governance, we should explore non- or
under-utilized materials and devise methods for their analysis.
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